Maoists tailed CRPF for 12 hrs

For about 12 hours, Maoists trailed the 62nd battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) like a shadow as they returned from a three-day combing operation. The Maoists, who were accompanied by a tribal outfit of the Bhumkal Militia, watched and waited for the right moment before ambushing and attacking the oblivious security personnel on Tuesday.
The attack that took place in the dense forests of Mukrana between the Chintalnar and Tadimetla blocks in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh claimed 76 lives.
CRPF sources at the Chintagufa camp, about 48 km from the Dornapal junction on the Andhra Pradesh-Jagdalpur national highway, listed the strategic mistakes of the personnel.
The 82-strong contingent of the CRPF battalion was returning home in one group from a three-day combing operation in the forests. This, a source said, was avoidable.
"On Monday evening, the tired CRPF men reached the Tadimetla area and decided to stay put in the forest. Instead of returning to the Chintagufa camp about 7 km away or moving on to Chintalnar 10-12 km away, the men selected a clearing in the forest and spent the night there. It was the biggest blunder," a CRPF deputy commandant said.
The Maoists, who had been watching the CRPF forces from a hill top around their temporary camp, silently surrounded the resting force from all sides. As soon as they woke up at 6 am, the Maoists ambushed the police forces, attacking them with grenades and bullets. The militia simultaneously attacked the forces with arrows, daggers and axes.
The incident raked up the pertinent question of whether Operation Green Hunt, launched against the Maoists by the Centre, would be a losing battle. The ability of the forces to fight a long-drawn battle with the Maoists came under a cloud.
The 62nd battalion, which suffered the worst-ever loss in the recent incident, comprises seven companies of armed forces; each company has 135 personnel. Apart from the 945 members, there are another 250 members in the battalion to assist the armed forces.
"It is easy to find excuses, but the fact remains that we need to be better prepared for this kind of battle. Nobody will help us work out strategies. We have to do it on our own. We have fought bigger battles. Even in the Kargil War, we did not lost such a large number of people in a single attack. There is definitely something wrong," said a Sikh jawan of the battalion.
Despite being in the forests of Dantewada for some time, the CRPF forces did not have a clue about the interior areas and the surrounding hillocks.
"The Andhra Pradesh model should be an eye opener (for the CRPF). Most of the time, the combing parties of Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh do not move together. They follow a certain pattern while undertaking combing operations. They move forward in circles. If a party of five to six commandos move in one direction, it is followed by another party forming a circle around the first party. The third party moves in a similar way.
This reduces the chances of the Maoists ambushing the forces from all sides. If they fire at one circle of commandos, the other two circles can immediately retaliate. That is why there has never been such a heavy casualty to the forces in our state," a top officer in the Andhra Pradesh Police department said.
Besides, the official explained, the Greyhounds do not move on the main road. They preferred to walk on either side of the thoroughfare to escape landmines.
"Unless very essential, the forces have not been using vehicles during combing operations in the last few years. Most of the times, they prefer trekking. Whenever they have used vehicles in the past, there have been explosions," the source recalled.
The Andhra Pradesh Police had also developed a strong informer network among the locals, making it easier to track the movement of the Maoists.
They also used the services of the surrendered Maoists to understand the ins and outs of the forest areas, so that they could keep a tab on the movement of the rebels.
This, sources said, was clearly lacking in the Chhattisgarh Police and the paramilitary forces. On the other hand, the Maoists had established their own strong intelligence among the tribals.
"The tribals don't cooperate with us. If we try to talk to them, they don't respond. Instead, they pass on information about us to the Maoists," said a CRPF commandant at Kankerwada camp, about 19 km from Chintalnar.
"We have set up a stitching centre and a school to help the tribals, but nobody makes use of them. They run away into the forests at the first given opportunity every morning in the name of procuring forest produce.
They return only in the evening. They act as Maoist informers," he complained. So, how long can the operation against the Maoists go on without adequate preparedness? "Well, we need to rework our strategies, learn from our setbacks.
These decisions have to be taken at the highest level.